




















   
COLLEGE EDUCATION AND WAGES IN THE U.K.: 
ESTIMATING CONDITIONAL AVERAGE STRUCTURAL 





























ISSN 0924-7815 College Education and Wages in the U.K.: Estimating
Conditional Average Structural Functions in
Nonadditive Models with Binary Endogenous
Variables
Tobias J. Klein∗
Netspar, CentER, Tilburg University
September 4, 2009
Abstract
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icy evaluation. Our results indicate that returns to college systematically diﬀer between
actual college graduates and actual college non-graduates. They are on average higher for
college graduates and positively related to selection into college for 96 percent of the in-
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1. Introduction
In labor economics it is well understood that estimating the returns to college education is
anything but straightforward.1 One reason for this is that an individual’s educational choice is
likely to be based on information that is superior to what is recorded in the data. For example,
if ability is unobserved and positively related to the return to a college degree, then we might
expect individuals with high ability to be more likely to obtain a college degree. A direct
consequence of this is that a simple regression of wages on an indicator for college education
yields upward biased estimates of the average return to college education.
Neither matching techniques nor standard instrumental variables estimators (referred to as
2SLS from now on) are able to overcome this problem because they preclude any unobserved
dependence between the return to a college degree and selection into college education (Heck-
man and Vytlacil, 1998; Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil, 2006; Wooldridge, 2007). However,
followingImbens and Angrist (1994), Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, HV in the remainder) show
that the average return for a well-deﬁned subgroup can be estimated using a local instrumental
variables estimator. It is local because it estimates the return using only observations for which
the probability to obtain a college degree falls into a small neighborhood.2
In this paper we set up a ﬂexible correlated random coeﬃcient model that allows for bi-
nary endogenous variables. We develop a semiparametric local instrumental variables estimator
for identiﬁed features of this model, among others the conditional average structural function
(CASF), which is the expected wage if (no) college education is assigned to an individual. The
CASF depends both on observed and unobserved characteristics that lead to selection into col-
lege. The identiﬁable features that are estimated are directly related to the marginal and average
treatment eﬀect in policy evaluation. Hence, the estimator is suitable for many other situations
in which a binary endogenous variable is related to its eﬀect. One example is the estimation of
1See Griliches (1977)and Card (2001)for surveyson the returns to schoolingand Solmonand Taubman(1973)
on the returns to college education.
2See Heckman and Vytlacil (2001, 2005) as well as Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006) for a comprehensive
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the eﬀect of participation in a training program on unemployment duration, where the partici-
pation decision is made in light of the idiosyncratic expected eﬀect of the program.
We implement this estimator using data from United Kingdom’s National Child Develop-
ment Survey (NCDS). Our results indicate that returns to college systematically diﬀer between
college graduates and college non-graduates. They are on average higher for college graduates.
We ﬁnd that returns are positively related to selection into college for 96 percent of the indi-
viduals. The diﬀerence in returns between those who actually attend college and those who do
not is largest for individuals with low math test scores, less educated mothers, and individuals
whose father’s occupation is associated with a lower social class. Many of those individuals
actually do not attend college, but would proﬁt from doing so if they were to have high levels
of unobserved ability. Thus, within this well-speciﬁed subgroup of individuals, those with high
levels of unobserved ability should be encouraged to attend college.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents and discusses the
econometric approach. In Section 3 we describe the data set. Section 4 contains the empirical
results. In Section 5 we assess the validity of the instruments. Section 6 concludes.
2. Econometric Approach
2.1. Econometric Model
Our point of departure is the correlated random coeﬃcient model
Y = X
′ϕ(D,U,V) (1)
D = 1{P(Z) ≥ V}. (2)College Education and Wages in the U.K. 4
Y is the log hourly wage at the age of 33, X is a K-vector of covariates that includes a constant
term, a math test score, family background variables, and regional indicators.3 D is an indicator
for having received college education. Z contains X and variables that are excluded from the
wage equation (instruments). In our analysis these excluded variables are indicators for the
parents’ interest in the education of the child. At least one variable in X or Z is continuous. U
is unobserved and possibly vector-valued. V is an unobserved scalar random variable. ϕ( , , )
is a vector valued function and P( ) is a scalar-valued function. We will refer to (1) as the
wage equation and (2) as the selection equation. This model allows for unobserved dependence
between wages and selection into college because V enters both the wage equation and the
selection equation. We will later interpret low values of V as representing high unobserved
ability regarding formal schooling, and high values of V as representing low ability.
We impose the following stochastic restrictions.
Assumption 1 (Stochastic Restrictions): (i) (U,V) are jointly independent of (X,Z) and (ii) U
is independent of V.
Assumption 1(i) prescribes that the distribution of V is unrelated to all variables in X and Z.
Assumption 1(ii) restricts the randomness in Y through U to be unrelated to V.4
The approach taken here is inspired by the nonparametric identiﬁcation result in HV. They
show nonparametric identiﬁcation of various parameters of interest under the assumption that
(U,V) is jointly independent of Z conditional on X, and that X is is not aﬀected by the choice of
D.5 In addition they require that there is a continuous variable in Z that is not in X. In practice,
however, the typical situation is that researchers only have access to discrete instruments, e.g.
3We will denote (vectors of) random variables by uppercase letters and their respective typical elements by
lowercase letters.
4One can show that this is not restrictive because there exists an observationally equivalent model with three
unobservables,UD in theselectionequation,U0 intheoutcomeequationfor D = 0, andU1 intheoutcomeequation
for D = 1, that are not restricted to be independent of one another. Derivations are available upon request from the
author.
5The requirementthat X is is not aﬀected by the choice of D is weaker than the assumptionthat X is exogenous.
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when exogenous variation in eligibility rules is used (Battistin and Rettore, 2008, e.g.). It is
therefore worth noting that under Assumption 1 we can instead exploit continuous variation in
X. Another diﬀerence is that HV require that Z shifts the probability to observe D = 1 from 0 to
1, given X, whereas we only require this for the unconditional probability to observe D = 1. To
summarize, the stochastic restrictions in HV are weaker but the support conditions are stronger.
In Section 2.4 we discuss how Assumption 1 restricts the set variables that can be included in
X.
Apart from the stochastic restrictions, we assume that the following regularity conditions
hold.
Assumption 2 (Regularity Conditions): (i) All ﬁrst moments exist and (ii) the distribution of V
is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure.
Assumption 2(i) ensures that all parameters of interest deﬁned below exist. Assumption
2(ii) implies that V is a continuous random variable. This allows us, without loss of generality
(w.l.o.g.), to normalize V from now on to be uniformly distributed on the unit interval, see,
e.g., Vytlacil (2002) for details. It then follows immediately from Assumption 1(i) that P(Z)
is identiﬁed since it is equal to Pr(D = 1|Z). For simplicity, we will write P for P(Z) in the
remainder, and denote its typical element by p.
The CASF is the average outcome when we assign D = d, X = x, and V = v, i.e.
(3) G(d, x,v) ≡ x
′E[ϕ(d,U,v)].
Here, we average over U. The terminology CASF is related to the one used by Blundell and
Powell (2003). They suggest to focus on recovering the average structural function,
(4) ¯ G(d, x) ≡ x
′E[ϕ(d,U,V)]College Education and Wages in the U.K. 6
in our case, where we also average over V.





the vector of conditional average ceteris paribus eﬀects, understanding the notion of ceteris
paribusasholdingallotherfactors constant,includingV, whileagainaveragingoverU. Finally,
(6)
∂ ¯ G(d, x)
∂x
= E[ϕ(d,U,V)]
is the vector of average ceteris paribus eﬀects, where we again average over V.
Equation (2) prescribes how the decision to attend college depends on V. For a given P = p,
those individuals with V ≤ p sort into college and those with V > p do not. Hence, we can
think of low values of V as representing high levels of ability, and high values representing low
ability. The dependence of the CASF and the conditional average ceteris paribus eﬀects on V is
therefore informative about the relationship between wages and selection into college, and how
this relationship depends on observed characteristics X.
The parameters of interest that were deﬁned above are directly related to the treatment eﬀect
parameters in policy evaluation. The diﬀerence in the CASF between D = 1 and D = 0 is
Bj¨ orklund and Moﬃt’s (1987) marginal treatment eﬀect (MTE) for X = x,





This is the expected eﬀect of a college degree on wages for a given level of unobserved ability
and for a given vector of covariates. The average treatment eﬀect (ATE) is the average MTE
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recalling that we have normalized V to be uniformly distributed. It follows from Assumption
1 that the unconditional ATE is equal to the expression in equation (8), evaluated at the mean
of X. The average treatment eﬀect on the treated (ATT) can be obtained by integrating over
the distribution of V, conditional on D = 1, and evaluating the expression at the mean of X
conditional on D = 1. For the average treatment eﬀect on the untreated (ATU) we use the
distribution of V conditional on D = 0 and the mean of X conditional on D = 0.6
2.2. Identiﬁcation
In this subsection, we show that the CASF is identiﬁed. Because of the multiplicative structure
of the wage equation, identiﬁcation of the CASF at D = d, V = v and X = x, equation (3), is
equivalent to identiﬁcation of the conditional average ceteris paribus eﬀects, equation (5).7 The
average structural function, equation (4), and average ceteris paribus eﬀects, equation (6), are
identiﬁed at D = d if the CASF is identiﬁed at all v in the open unit interval, recalling that we
have normalized V to be uniformly distributed and that the endpoints have probability measure
zero. Finally, if the (conditional) average structural function is identiﬁed at both D = 0 and
D = 1, then so is the average (marginal) treatment eﬀect.
From equation (1) it follows that
(9) E[Y|D = 1,P = p,X = x] = x
′E[ϕ(1,U,V)|D = 1,P = p,X = x]
which is equal to
x
′E[ϕ(1,U,V)|P ≥ V,P = p,X = x]
by the selection model in equation (2). Assumption 1(i) implies that P is independent of (U,V)
6See Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2000) for the relationship between treatment parameters within a latent
variable framework.
7Since X includes a constant, the intercept is identiﬁed once the conditional average ceteris paribus eﬀects are
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so that this is equal to
x
′E[ϕ(1,U,V)|X = x, p ≥ V].
By Assumption 1(i), we can reexpress this as
x
′E[ϕ(1,U,V)|p ≥ V] =: x
′β(1, p).
E[ϕ(1,U,V)|p ≥ V] is a vector valued function of p which we will denote by β(1, p) in the
remainder. Since the left hand side of equation (9) is identiﬁed at points x and p of the support
of X and P in the D = 1 population, respectively, β(1, p) is identiﬁed if we observe at least
K linearly independent values of X for D = 1 and P = p. β(0, p) is deﬁned in an analogous
manner and a similar result holds for D = 0 and P = p.
Starting from this, we show that the CASF is identiﬁed.8 We call p a limit point of the
support of P, if P has a continuous density in a neighborhood around p which is bounded away
from zero. Notice that at P = p derivatives of diﬀerentiable functions of P are identiﬁed.
Proposition 1 (Identiﬁcation): Assume that β(0, p) and β(1, p) are continuously diﬀerentiable
with respect to p and that we observe at least K linearlyindependent values of X for D = 0, D =
1, and all values of P in a neighborhood around p (rank condition). Then, under Assumptions
1 and 2 the CASF is identiﬁed at V = p, where p is a limit point of the support of P, and given
by
G(0, x,v) = x
′
 




G(1, x,v) = x
′
 





8We state the result in a proposition which resembles Theorem 1 in Carneiro and Lee (2009). Following HV,
they show nonparametric identiﬁcation under weaker stochastic restrictions than the ones in Assumption 1, at
the price of stronger support conditions that need to hold for their result. Only when they estimate the model
they impose the restrictions in Assumption 1. We show the proof for two reasons. First, strictly speaking, our
identiﬁcation result is not implied by their Lemma 1, even though their proof is similar to ours. Second, our rank
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Proof. We show identiﬁcation of G(1, x,v). The proof for G(0, x,v) is similar. Recall that we
have normalized V to be uniformly distributed. By deﬁnition,
x
′E[ϕ(1,U,V)|p ≥ V] = x
′β(1, p).







ϕ(1,u,v) µ(du) dv/p = x
′β(1, p),







ϕ(1,u,v) µ(du) dv = p   x
′β(1, p)





ϕ(1,u, p) µ(du) = x




If pisalimitpointofthesupportof P thentherankconditionimpliesthatβ(1, p)and∂β(1, p)/∂p
are identiﬁed at P = p. The left hand side is the object of interest. ￿
Finally, notice that identiﬁcation relies on the monotonicity of D in P, which is implied by
the selection model and allows us to formulate equation (10).9
2.3. Estimation
We have established that under the conditions of Proposition 1
E[Y|D = d,P = p,X = x] = x
′β(d, p) , d ∈ {0,1},
9See Klein (forthcoming)for a discussion and an analysis of the case in which monotonicitydoes not hold, but
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where β(d, p) is a coeﬃcient vector that is a function of the observable D, and P, which can be
estimated.10 We parametrically estimate P using a logit model. We assume that the coeﬃcient
functions are bounded and have bounded second derivatives. This allows us to estimate them by
local linear smoothing.11 This estimation procedure is usually motivated by a Taylor expansion
of the coeﬃcient function in ˜ p about ˜ p = p which yields
βk(d, ˜ p) = βk(d, p) +
∂βk(d, p)
∂p




∂p2   (˜ p − p)
2,
where ¯ p is a point between p and ˜ p. We select all observations with D = d and index them by
i, i = 1,...,n. The estimates of β(d, p) and ∂β(d, p)/∂p are given by
(11)

         
  β(d, p)
  ∂β(d, p)/∂p





     









          
yi −

         
xi
(pi − p)   xi

         
′ 




         

          
2
     
     
,
where K( ) is a kernel function with the usual properties and h is the bandwidth.12
From these estimates of β(d, p) and ∂β(d, p)/∂p, which we provide with hats in the remain-
der, we calculate the vector of conditional average ceteris paribus eﬀects, equation (5), and the
10This is a version of the varyingcoeﬃcient model which was suggested by Cleveland, Grosse, and Shyu(1991)
and Hastie and Tibshirani (1993).
11This assumption is stronger than what is required for identiﬁcation. A suﬃcient condition for this to hold
is that the second derivative of E[ϕ(D,U,V)|D = d,V = v] with respect to V is bounded for d = 0 and d = 1.
Concerning the properties of the estimator see e.g. Fan and Zhang (1999) and Xia and Li (1999) for details as well
as a proof of consistency and results on rates of convergence.
12Write ˜ yi =
 
K((pi − p)/h)   yi and ˜ xi =
 
K((pi − p)/h)   (x′
i,(pi − p)x′
i)′. Then,
    β(d, p)










     
−1 





     .
Following Fan (1992) we add a matrix with elements equal to 0.001 to the matrix
 n
i=1 ˜ xi˜ x′
i to ensure that it can
be inverted. We use an Epanechnikov kernel and estimate the coeﬃcient vectors at 101 grid points between 0
and 1. The bandwidths are chosen using a leave-one-out cross validation procedure. Figure 5 in the Appendix
shows, separately for D = 0 and D = 1, the sample mean integrated squared error plotted against the bandwidth.
It decreases until a value of the bandwidth of 1.2 for D = 0 and ﬂat thereafter, so we use 1.2 as the bandwidth
to allow for maximum ﬂexibility. For D = 1 it is minimal at 0.8, so we use 0.8 as the bandwidth. In Proposition
1, we require the rank to be K. Here, we also use interaction terms between P and X for the estimator in (11),
and therefore we require it to be 2K. This rank condition holds in our data, i.e. the weighted n × 2K matrix of
explanatory variables and interaction terms is of rank 2K at all evaluation points p.College Education and Wages in the U.K. 11
CASF using the formulae in Proposition 1. From these we calculate values of other identiﬁable
features of interest and simulate average eﬀects.
Since ﬁtted values pi were parametrically estimated in a ﬁrst step we do not expect them to
have an impact on the distribution of   β(d, p) and   ∂β(d, p)/∂p in a ﬁrst order asymptotic sense.
However, we obtain conﬁdence intervals, accounting for the ﬁrst step estimation error, from
1,000 bootstrap replications. In our application they are wider than bootstrapped conﬁdence
intervals that do not account for the ﬁrst step estimation error. We also account for simulation
error if simulations are undertaken.
2.4. Discussion
In this section we brieﬂy discuss the econometric approach taken here. There are two key ad-
vantages. First, functional form restrictions are mild. X could include approximating functions
in such a way that the number of approximating functions grows with the sample size. Then,
following Newey (1997), equation (1) could be interpreted as a series approximation to a gen-
eral nonseparable structural equation Y = g(X,D,U,V).
Second, the estimatorthat is proposed here allows for, and is able to recover, richer selection
patterns than 2SLS, matching, and the local instrumental variables estimator for the additive
model that is implemented e.g. by Carneiro and Lee (2009).13 The additive model allows for
selection based on the return, but imposes that the selection pattern does not depend on X. If
we express X as (1,X′
−1)′ and ϕ( , , ) as (ϕ1( , , ),ϕ−1( , , )′)′, equation (1) can be written as
Y = ϕ1(D,U,V) + X
′
−1ϕ−1(D,U,V),
13Heckman and Vytlacil (1998), Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006) and Wooldridge (2007) point out that
2SLS requires that the diﬀerence in the coeﬃcients, ϕ(1,U,V) − ϕ(0,U,V), is not correlated with D and Z. This
precludes selection that is related to the return to a college degree. Matching estimators require that conditional
on a set of observed variables, say ¯ X, the diﬀerence in the coeﬃcients is mean independent of D (Rosenbaum and
Rubin, 1983), i.e.
E[ϕ(1,U,V)− ϕ(0,U,V)| ¯ X,D] = E[ϕ(1,U,V)− ϕ(0,U,V)| ¯ X]
if we maintain the functional form restrictions. Hence, matching estimators cannot be used if there is selection
based on the return conditional on ¯ X.College Education and Wages in the U.K. 12
and the additive model as
(12) Y = µ(D,U,V) + X
′
−1γ(D,U).
The sorting pattern is characterized by the dependence of the MTE on V, and this dependence
is unrelated to X for the additive model.14 In Section 4, we examine whether the additive model
is consistent with our data.
The estimator that is proposed in this paper requires that there is a continuous variable in X
or Z. 2SLS does not require continuous variation in X or Z because the assumption of uncor-
relatedness between the eﬀect and the endogenous variable can be exploited instead (Heckman
and Vytlacil, 1998).
Interestingly, both the nonparametric identiﬁcation result in HV and the matching estimator
do not require the conditioning variables in X and ¯ X, respectively, to be exogenous. For the
nonparametric identiﬁcation result in HV, the addition of variables to X increases the likelihood
that the assumption of independence between Z and (U,V) conditional on X holds. At the
same time, however, it becomes less likely that there is continuous variation in Z given X that
shifts the probability to observe D = 1 from 0 to 1, which is necessary unless one directly
estimates local average treatment eﬀects instead (Fr¨ olich, 2007). Also for matching, adding
more variables to ¯ X makes it more likely that the conditional mean independence assumption
holds. In both cases the conditioning variables can be thought of as predictors of wage levels.
However, also with these techniques we can only recover the causal eﬀect of X on wages and
on the returns to a college degree if we assume that X is exogenous. Besides, under exogeneity
of X we can rely on weaker assumptions on the support of Z given X, which turns out to be of
key importance in our application because the instruments are discrete.
14The MTE in the additive model is E[µ(1,U,v)−µ(0,U,v)]+ x′
−1E[γ(1,U)−γ(0,U)] and hence the eﬀect of a
change in v is not related to x.College Education and Wages in the U.K. 13
3. Data
The estimator is implemented using NCDS data from the U.K. The NCDS is conducted by the
Centre for Longitudinal Studies at the Institute of Education in London. It is a longitudinal data
set and keeps detailed records for all those living in the U.K. who were born between March 3
and 9, 1958. The data were ﬁrst collected at birth in 1958, in 1965 (age 7), in 1969 (age 11),
in 1974 (age 16), in 1981 (age 23), in 1991 (age 33), in 1999-2000 (age 41-42), in 2004-2005
(age 46-47), and in 2008-2009 (age 50-51). The NCDS has gathered data on child development
from birth to early adolescence, as well as on child care, medical care, health, physique, school
readiness, home environment, educational progress, parental involvement, cognitive and social
growth, family relationships, economic activity, income, training, and housing.
In a related application, Blundell, Dearden, and Sianesi (2005) study these data using 2SLS,
a control function estimator, and matching techniques. We use the same procedures to prepare
the data for analysis. For a more detailed data description and variable deﬁnitions the reader is
referred to their paper.
For the analysis we select working men for whom information on their highest educational
degree is available.15 Our core sample thus consists of 3,609 observations, of which 646
(17.9%) did not complete their O-levels, 986 (27.3%) completed their O-levels, 960 (26.6%)
did so for the A-levels, and 1,017 (28.2%) completed college education.16 We distinguish be-
tween college graduates (D = 1), who have completed some kind of higher education, and the
remaining individuals (D = 0). Test scores are rescaled so that each of them lies between zero
and one.
Following Mincer (1974), the outcome of interest is the log hourly wage in 1991, at the age
of 33. The NCDS contains information on a number of family background variables such as the
respective parents’ ages, their years of education, whether the mother was working when the
15Information on the education is not available for non-working individuals. Out of 3,945 individuals 270
(6.84%) are not working. For 66 of the remaining individuals information on the education is missing.
16We say that an individual completes his A-levels if he completed at least one A-level, which is generally
obtained at the end of secondary school, see Blundell, Dearden, and Sianesi (2005) for details.College Education and Wages in the U.K. 14
child was 16, as well as the number of siblings. Furthermore, we observe the occupation of the
father when the child was 16, in particular whether he was an intermediate employee. This can
be interpreted as a proxy for the social class.
As discussed in Section 2.4, variables in X need to be selected such that they are unrelated
to U and V. This precludes the inclusion of indicators for secondary school type because cer-
tain secondary schools are more likely to be chosen by individuals who plan to attend college
thereafter. Also test scores might be related to unobserved ability. For that reason we include
only the math test score at the age of 7 in the set of covariates and consider it a proxy for purely
analytical skills, which are unrelated to other types of unobserved ability such as assertiveness
and social intelligence that aﬀect wages at the age of 33 as well as the decision to attend col-
lege. We do not include the number of siblings because it might be related to unobserved ability
through interaction of the child with his siblings, again thinking of unobserved ability as being
related to traits such as assertiveness and social intelligence. However, we include the mother’s
years of education into X and consider it a proxy for the kind of education the child receives at
home, irrespective of his unobserved ability.17
We discarded some additional variables such as the respective age of the parents when the
child was 16, because the corresponding coeﬃcient estimates were insigniﬁcant in a ﬁrst stage
regressionofan indicatorforcollegeeducationon thefullset ofcovariatesand indicatorsfor the
mother’s interest in the child’s education when the child was 16.18 In addition, these discarded
variables had insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient estimates in the wage equation when the eﬃcient GMM
estimator (to be described in Section 5) was implemented. Most of the indicators for both the
father’s occupation and region were dropped as well, which did not have a big eﬀect on the
remaining signiﬁcant coeﬃcient estimates.
We use indicators for the mother’s interest in the child’s education when aged 16 as instru-
17Currie and Moretti (2003) show that maternal education is endogenous in a regression that explains birth
outcomes. Carneiro, Meghir, and Parey (2007)extend this ﬁnding to outcomes such as ability test scores and other
types of outcomes for children and adolescents. However, to our knowledge, it has not been shown that maternal
education is also endogenous in a wage equation.
18Choices were made using both linear regression and logit estimates.College Education and Wages in the U.K. 15
no college college
mean std. mean std.
log hourly wage at the age of 33 1.929 0.400 2.329 0.369
math ability at 7 0.446 0.277 0.584 0.293
missing 0.113 - 0.116 -
family background variables when the child was 16
mother’s years of education 7.133 4.455 7.857 4.945
missing 0.269 - 0.256 -
father is intermediate employee 0.019 - 0.108 -
missing 0.108 - 0.101 -
mother’s interest in the education of the child when the child was 16
expects too much 0.020 - 0.023 -
very interested 0.190 - 0.462 -
some interest 0.221 - 0.163 -
little interest 0.141 - 0.025 -
number of obs. 2,592 1,017
Summary statistics for our core sample of individuals who are working at the age of
33 and for whom information on the highest educational degree is available. Standard
deviations for indicator variables are not shown.
Table 1: Summary statistics.
ments for the decision to attend college. The interest in the child’s education is assessed by the
child’s head teacher. It is an objective assessment of the parent’s behavior, because the head
teacher is not asked to evaluate the appropriateness of the parents’ interest in the education,
but rather to describe it. We expect this variable to be measured accurately because the teacher
usually knows the parents from personal meetings.19 It is plausibly unrelated to a child’s ability,
as long as the importance parents attach to the child’s education does not depend on the child’s
unobserved characteristics. This is an assumption that will be formally tested by conducting
tests of overidentifying restrictions in Section 5.
Table 1 shows summary statistics for our sample. The statistics are shown separately for
college graduates and college non-graduates. On average, college graduates have a higher math
ability test score, more highly educated mothers, and they are more likely to have a father who
19It would be problematicif the assessment was made by an interviewer because he would have to make it based
on the impression he gained in the interview. It would be even more troublesome if the parents were asked to
answer this question themselves, because their answer would probably be related to their child’s ability.College Education and Wages in the U.K. 16
is an intermediate employee. In addition, individuals who went to college are more likely to
have parents who were interested in their education.
There are missing values for some variables in the data. In the analysis we assume that they
are missing at random, set the value of the respective variable to zero, and include indicators for
missing information in the set of covariates.20
4. College Education and Wages in the U.K.
First stage estimates were obtained using a logit model and are not reported here.21 Since most
explanatory variables are indicator variables our speciﬁcation is very close to the series logit
speciﬁcation implemented by Hirano, Imbens, and Ridder (2003).22
Figure 1 shows the sample distributions of the ﬁtted values of P. For both D = 0 and D = 1
the support is almost equal to the full unit interval. Note that the distributions diﬀer between
D = 0 and D = 1. This illustrates that the variables in Z have explanatory power.
The identiﬁcation result in Proposition 1 implies that in principle, instead of using the
mother’s interest in the child’s education as an excluded variable, we can exploit the non-
linearity of P in X for identiﬁcation. To check whether this is possible here we obtained logit
estimates, with and without the excluded variables in Z, obtained ﬁtted values of P, and then
regressed Y on X and P. With the excluded variables in Z the coeﬃcient on P is 0.715 with a
standard error of 0.065.23 Without the excluded variables the coeﬃcient estimate changes sign
and is equal to −0.305 with a standard error of 0.340. This shows that identiﬁcation oﬀ the
20The table shows that the probability a value is missing is about equal for college graduates and college non-
graduates.
21They are reported in the Online Appendix to this paper. The coeﬃcient estimates for our ﬁnal speciﬁcation
conﬁrm to expectations and are in line with the literature which takes a closer look at the channels through which
parents’ education is transmitted to the children, see Goldberger (1989) and Haveman and Wolfe (1995) for an
overview and discussion.
22We tried several speciﬁcations with interaction terms but they were generally not signiﬁcant. There are two
variables, math ability at the age of 7 and the mother’s years of education, which we treat as continuous. In the
second stage, we will estimate coeﬃcients on those variables, which are functions of V. Therefore, to keep the
results nicely interpretable, we have not included higher order terms for those variables.
23Again standard errors are obtained from 1,000 bootstrap replications and correct for the ﬁrst stage estimation
error. For comparison, the two stage least squares estimate is 0.781 with a standard error of 0.073.College Education and Wages in the U.K. 17
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Figure 1: Sample distribution of the propensity score.
functional form is not a successful strategy here. The reason for this is that P is very close to
being linear in X.24 We now present the main results.
4.1. Wage Levels and Eﬀects of Covariates
Figure 6 in the Appendix contains estimates of the conditional average ceteris paribus eﬀects
with respect to the variables in the vector X, (5), that are plotted against V, separately for D = 0
and D = 1. Figure 2 is an example and shows that for D = 0 the eﬀect of the math test score
at age 7 is positive and signiﬁcant for low values of V. Recall that, according to the selection
model, low values of V induce individuals to attend college. Thus, we should think of low
values of V as representing high unobservable ability. Figure 6 shows that for individuals with
high levels of unobserved ability and D = 0 wages increase in the math test score and the
mother’s years of education, and are higher when the father is an intermediate employee. When
D = 1 the eﬀect of those variables does not depend on V.
Table5 (in theAppendix)presents estimatesoftheimpactsof covariateson wages for D = 0
(left panel) and for D = 1 (right panel).25 The fourth column contains the result of a test for a
24The R2 of a linear regression of the ﬁtted value of P on Z is 0.967 with the excluded variables in Z and 0.9787
without them.
25The additive model was estimated using a regression of the log hourly wage on a polynomial that is linear in
X and quadratic in the ﬁrst stage estimate of P, separately for D = 0 and D = 1. The order of the polynomial in
















Figure 2: Average ceteris paribus eﬀects of change in math score at the age of 7, estimates and
95% conﬁdence intervals.
particular kind of unobserved heterogeneity. We say that unobserved heterogeneity is present
whenever the impact of a component of X, including the constant, depends on V. Therefore,
we test whether the linear approximation to the slope of the conditional average ceteris paribus
eﬀect with respect to V is zero.26 We ﬁnd evidence for a non-zero slope for the impact of the
math ability test score, the indicator for Scotland and the constant for D = 0. Not surprisingly
there is a bias in the coeﬃcient estimate of the additive model whenever the test indicates that
the type of heterogeneity we test for here is present. This shows that the additive model is too
restrictive for our data.
Figure 7 in the Appendix contains an estimate of the CASF for a representative individual
with median characteristics. Interestingly, the CASF increases in V for D = 0. This means that
the kind of ability measured by V (for which low levels are associated with a higher likelihood
of obtaining a college degree) is negatively related to wages if no college degree is obtained.
Conversely, high V types do better when not obtaining a college degree than low V types do.
This is compatible with the view that college graduates would in fact not do better on the labor
model is the coeﬃcient on the respective variable in X.
26Here we face two sources of estimation error. First, the error that stems from estimating the conditional
average ceteris paribus eﬀect itself and second, the error from estimating the linear approximation to its slope.College Education and Wages in the U.K. 19













Plotted for a man aged 33 who has a math ability test score of 0.5, whose mother has 9 years of education,
whose father is not an intermediate employee, and who does not live in London, Scotland or Wales.
Figure 3: Marginal treatment eﬀect for individual with median characteristics.
market than college non-graduates if one would have prevented them from attending college.
4.2. Selection into College
Figure 3 shows the MTE for the same representative individual with median characteristics.
A negative slope implies that individuals with low values of V, i.e. high ability types, have a
higher expected return to obtaining a college degree. Carneiro and Lee (2009, p. 201) point out
that individuals base their selection into college education on their comparative advantage with
respect to monetary beneﬁts if the MTE is higher for those individuals who go to college, i.e. if
the MTE decreases in V conditional on observables X.
Figures 3 and 7 were plotted for an individual with median characteristics. Since X varies
across individuals, it is interesting to take a closer look at the dependence of the MTE on V
when X varies across individuals. Variation in covariates induces variation in the slope of the
MTE.Therefore, weestimatedalinearapproximationto theslopeoftheCASF and theMTEfor
every individual to investigate for how many individuals the comparative advantage hypothesisCollege Education and Wages in the U.K. 20
fraction 95% conf. int.
level, no college 0.973 0.894 0.996
level, college 0.664 0.158 0.862
MTE 0.042 0.026 0.049






ATT, matching estimate 0.274 0.030
GMM 0.773 0.107
For the matching estimate of the ATT as well as the
OLS and GMM estimate the set of covariates is the
same as for the estimates presented in Table 4. Stan-
dard errors for the ﬁrst three estimates as well as the
matching estimate were obtained from 1,000 boot-
strap replications. Both OLS and GMM standard er-
rors are analytic and robust to heteroskedasticity.
Table 3: Average treatment eﬀects.
holds.
Table 2 contains the fractions of the population for which, respectively, the slope of the
CASF and the MTE are positive. In order to obtain those numbers, linear approximations to the
slope were estimated. The slope of the level is positive for 97% of the individuals if we assign
D = 0 to all of them. If we assign D = 1 to everybody, it is positive for 66% of the individuals.
Interestingly, the slope of the MTE is positive for only 4.2% of the individuals, indicating that
the comparative advantage hypothesis holds for the remaining 95.8% of the individuals.27
If selection is based on V, it is interesting to calculate average returns for diﬀerent subpop-
27This is in line with ﬁndings in previous studies including Willis and Rosen (1979) and Carneiro and Lee
(2009). Those two studies impose additivity and therefore the comparative advantage hypothesis either holds for
all individualsor fornone. In Table 5, we observedthat additivitydoes not holdandthat coeﬃcientestimates could
therefore be biased. In light of this, our results are reassuring as they rule out this source of bias and nevertheless
show that the comparative advantage hypothesis holds for almost all individuals. At this point, it is worth noting
that this way of thinking about the comparative advantage hypothesis ignores nonmonetary costs and beneﬁts. For
example, it could well be that a college degree is additionally associated with nonpecuniary beneﬁts such as the
pleasure of being educated. Such additional returns are not addressed in this paper.College Education and Wages in the U.K. 21
ulations. We ﬁrst calculate ATE using equation (8), replacing x with the population mean of
X. For ATT and ATU, we use the respective sample mean of X for D = 1 and D = 0 and sim-
ulate the distribution of V conditional on D, exploiting the structure of the selection model.28
Respective conﬁdence intervals account for the simulation error. In Table 3, our estimates are
compared to those obtained from an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, a matching esti-
mate, and the eﬃcient GMM estimate. Notably, and consistent with the ﬁnding that the MTE is
negatively sloped for almost all individuals, we ﬁnd that the ATT is higher than the ATU. The
ATE is between the ATT and the ATU.29
Not surprisingly, the OLS estimate is very close to the matching estimate since matching
is built on the assumption that conditional on observables, D is independent of the error term
in the outcome equation. The similarity between the OLS and the matching estimate indicates
that the functional form assumption imposed by the OLS estimator is innocuous for our data.
This could be because X contains many indicator variables. However, the fact that there is a
diﬀerence between the matching estimate and our estimate of ATT (reported in Table 3) shows
that the conditional independence assumption that matching is based on might be violated.
We ﬁnd that both the OLS and the matching estimate are downward biased, indicating that
the selection bias is negative. Controlling for covariates, the estimates are both roughly equal
to the diﬀerence in the average wage for those individuals who are observed to have D =
1, averaging over low values of V according to equation (2), and the average wage for those
individuals who are observed to have D = 0, averaging over high values of V. Figure 7 in the
Appendix shows that for the representative individual, the wage depends positively on V when
we assign D = 0. However, the wage is ﬂat in V if we assign D = 1. Hence the downward bias.
Commonly, the GMM estimate is interpreted as estimating the average treatment eﬀect for
those individuals who are induced to attend college by the variables that are excluded from the
28For example, if we observe an individual with D = 0 and P = p, we draw values of V from a uniform
distribution on (p,1].
29We also ﬁnd this when we estimate the additive model, equation (12), and implement the matching estimator
for ATE and ATU.College Education and Wages in the U.K. 22





























The left curve is the empirical c.d.f. of simulated treatment eﬀects for college non-graduates and the right
curve is the empirical c.d.f. for college graduates.
Figure 4: Distribution of simulated treatment eﬀects.
outcome equation.30 The GMM estimate is higher than those obtained from other estimation
strategies.31
Next, we simulate the treatment eﬀect for every individual. For this we draw 100 values
of V, calculate the corresponding MTE, and then calculate the average MTE. If we observe
D = 0, we draw values of V from a uniform distribution on [p,1], and if D = 1 we draw them
from a uniform distribution on [0, p], where, respectively, p is the ﬁtted value of the probability
to obtain a college degree. The idea behind this is that by observing D and P we can infer
in which range V must lie. Since V is independent of P, it is uniformly distributed. Figure 4
shows that the distribution of simulated treatment eﬀects for individualswho actually graduated
from college ﬁrst order dominates the distribution of simulated treatment eﬀects for those who
did not do so. However, the support overlaps, indicating that there are individuals who did not
graduate from college and that would have beneﬁtted more (in monetary terms) from obtaining
30See, e.g., the discussion in Blundell, Dearden, and Sianesi (2005) and Imbens and Angrist (1994) as well as
Card (2001).
31In Section 5 we provide additional discussion and interpretation.College Education and Wages in the U.K. 23
a college degree than others who are college graduates.
Finally, we examine the dependence of the selection pattern on observed characteristics
more closely. It follows from equation (7) that the eﬀect of covariates on the MTE is given
by the diﬀerence in conditional average ceteris paribus eﬀects between D = 1 and D = 0.
Hence, it follows from Figure 6 that the dependence of the returns to college education on
V is larger for individuals with low math test scores, less educated mothers, and fathers that
are not intermediate employee. Within this well-deﬁned group, a policy maker should target
those individuals with high unobserved ability and strongly encourage them to attend college,
assuming that the policy maker’s objective is to allocate college education to those individuals
with the highest expected returns.32 Conversely, the screening eﬀort within other groups (e.g.
individuals with high math scores whose father is an intermediate employee) could be lower
because those individuals’ return to a college degree depends less on unobserved ability.33
5. Validity of Instruments
In this paper, indicators for the mother’s interest in the education of the child (when the child
was 16) serve as instruments for college education. These are valid instruments if the interest is
unrelated to unobserved ability and at the same time related to the decision to attend college. In
this section we assess the validity of the instruments by estimating standard Mincer (1974) type
wageequationsusingthegeneralizedmethodofmoments(GMM).Wecarry outoveridentifying
restrictions tests and tests for joint signiﬁcance of the excluded instruments. We do so for our
preferred and potential alternative sets of instruments. The candidate instruments are indicators
for the mother’s and father’s interest in the education of the child when the child was 7, 11, and
16, respectively.
To test whether the instruments are not weak or just mask variation in other individual
32See, e.g., Berger, Black, and Smith (2001) on proﬁling in the context of unemployment.
33Notice, however, that the test for heterogeneity in Table 5 shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that
the eﬀect of the mother’s years of education and the father being an intermediate employee does not depend on V.College Education and Wages in the U.K. 24
characteristics weadditionallyincludein X arace indicator, math abilityat age 11, verbal ability
at age 7 and 11, indicators for secondary school type, additional family background variables,
indicators for the occupation of the father, and a full set of region indicators.34
The sixth column of Table 4 presents eﬃcient two-step GMM estimates of the eﬀect of
attending college on the log hourly wage at the age of 33. The set of excluded variables varies
across the ten speciﬁcations. The ﬁrst six speciﬁcations use indicators for all values of the
interest in the child’s education (and the ones for the respective missing value).35 Speciﬁcations
7 through 10 use only the indicators for one category, respectively, as instruments.
F-statistics for the test of joint signiﬁcance of the excluded instruments are presented in
the fourth column of Table 4 and are calculated to detect the presence of weak instruments.
Values above 10 are considered acceptable (Bound, Jaeger, and Baker, 1995; Staiger and Stock,
1997). The ﬁfth column contains the p-values. Comparing speciﬁcations across Table 4 shows
that adding more instruments never decreases the partial R2 of the excluded instruments but
results in a decreased value of the F statistic. Including all potential instrumental variables,
speciﬁcation 6, may result in biased estimates of the returns to college education because the
corresponding F statisticis equal to 6.39, which is well below 10. By contrast, indicators for the
mother’s interest in the child’s education when the child was 16 could be a good set of candidate
instruments. The F statistic of 23.4 shows that these indicators are strongly related to D.
The last two columns of Table 4 display Hansen’s J statistic and the corresponding p-value
for the test of overidentifying restrictions. The null for this test is that the diﬀerence between
observed and predicted wages is not correlated with the instrument.36 It is rejected if the in-
struments are related to the error term or if diﬀerent instruments identify diﬀerent local average
treatment eﬀects, see Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006,
p. 392). In our case the null is rejected, at the 5% level, for speciﬁcations 2 and 3, suggesting
34Summarystatistics forall variablesbut theregionindicatorscanbe foundin the OnlineAppendixto this paper.
35There are four indicators for each parent and indicators for missing values. There were no missing values
when the child was 16.




































instruments num. iv part. R2 F p college ste. J p
interest in education, all values
1 mother at 16 4 0.026 23.400 0.000 0.773 0.107 5.103 0.164
2 mother at 11 and 16 9 0.036 14.690 0.000 0.629 0.085 18.921 0.015
3 mother at 7, 11 and 16 14 0.037 9.820 0.000 0.625 0.083 26.197 0.016
4 mother and father at 16 8 0.028 12.600 0.000 0.810 0.105 6.243 0.512
5 mother and father at 11 and 16 17 0.042 9.140 0.000 0.658 0.079 24.078 0.088
6 mother and father at 7, 11 and 16 26 0.046 6.390 0.000 0.639 0.077 33.436 0.121
interest by mother and father at 7, 11 and 16
7 only indicator for little interest 6 0.009 9.350 0.000 1.138 0.188 2.216 0.819
8 only indicator for some interest 6 0.008 5.320 0.000 0.434 0.165 2.845 0.724
9 only indicator for very interested 6 0.038 20.130 0.000 0.586 0.083 8.512 0.130
10 only indicator for overly concerned 6 0.005 3.130 0.000 0.537 0.227 2.950 0.708
All test statistics and standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
Table 4: Performance of alternative sets of instruments.College Education and Wages in the U.K. 26
that returns might be heterogeneous or that the exclusion restriction is violated for the instru-
ments.
Speciﬁcations 7 through 10 provide evidence that returns are heterogeneous because they
show that the estimate of the returns to college education depends on the indicators that are
employed as instruments. Speciﬁcation 9, e.g., estimates the return for those individuals whose
decisiontoattendcollegechanges iftheparentsbecomeveryinterestedintheireducation. Here,
all indicators should identify the average eﬀect for the same group. This is for instance because
the group of individuals whose decision to attend college is changed by their father’s taking an
interest in their education when the individual concerned was 16 should be (roughly) the same
group as the group of individuals whose decision to attend college is aﬀected by the mother’s
interest in their education when aged 11. Therefore, the overidentifying restrictions test should
only reject the null if the exclusion restriction is violated. This is not the case in speciﬁcations
7 though 10, so there is no evidence that the exclusion restriction does not hold.
To summarize, we conclude from Table 4 that the overidentifying restrictions tests yield
evidence in favor of eﬀect heterogeneity that is related to the decision to attend college, and
in favor of the assumption that the instruments can be excluded, i.e. that they are unrelated
to unobserved ability.37 Results show that the instruments are strongly correlated with college
attendance if not all indicators are selected. In Section 4, we therefore use indicator variables
for the mother’s interest in the child’s education when aged 16 as excluded variables because
for this set of variables the F statistic is particularly high.
37Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006, p. 397) point out that one can directly test for unobserved dependence
betweenthe returnto collegeand the decision to attend collegeby checkingwhetherthe expectedwage conditional
on X and P is linear in P. So we ﬁrst ﬁt P using a logit model and then regress Y on P, P2 and X. The coeﬃcient
on P2 is −1.034 with a standard error of 0.209. This standard error is obtained from 1,000 bootstrap replications
and accounts for the ﬁrst stage estimation error. We conclude that the GMM estimates presented in Table 4 are
indeed not estimates of the population average return to college, but rather estimates of local average returns for
diﬀerent subgroups, supporting our conclusion that the overidentifyingrestrictions tests yield evidence in favor of
eﬀect heterogeneity, rather than against the validity of the exclusion restriction.College Education and Wages in the U.K. 27
6. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we propose and implement a semiparametric local instrumental variables estima-
tor and use it to characterize the unobserved dependence between the monetary return to col-
lege education and selection into college in the U.K. We relate this dependence to observable
characteristics of the individuals. To accomplish this, the estimator requires that an exclusion
restriction holds unconditionally, that covariates are exogenous, and that there is continuous
variation in an instrument or a covariate.
Our empirical results indicate that sorting into college is based on the comparative advan-
tage for almost all individuals. Therefore, the average return to college education for college
graduates is larger than the average return for college non-graduates. We ﬁnd that the depen-
dence of selection into college and returns to college education is strongest for individuals with
low math test scores at age 7, individuals with less educated mothers, and for working-class
individuals.
This knowledge is likely to be of value to policy makers who often design institutions in
such a way that eligibility, e.g. for a subsidy, is related to observed individual characteristics.
We ﬁnd that returns to college education highly depend on unobserved ability for working-class
individuals in the U.K. Based on this knowledge a policy maker may want to encourage more
high ability working-class individuals to attend college. He could do so by oﬀering a subsidy
to all working-class individuals.38 Our results imply that among the individuals who would not
attend college without the subsidy, this subsidy will change the decision for the ones with the
highest return, which is exactly the target group.
The methods developed in this paper could be applied in various other contexts. For exam-
ple, they could be used to study how selection into a labormarket program is related to theeﬀect
of the program, possibly as a function of observable characteristics and labor market history.
Results could then be used to re-design eligibility rules in a such a way that the participation is
38In practice, it might not be possible to deﬁne eligibility according to social class. However, a good proxy for
this could be family income.College Education and Wages in the U.K. 28
allocated more eﬃciently. Since our estimation procedure does not require the excluded vari-
ables to be continuous, eligibility rules that were in place when the data were collected could
possibly be used as a source of exogenous variation.College Education and Wages in the U.K. 29
Appendix: Additional Tables and Figures




















These ﬁgures show, separately for D = 0 and D = 1, estimates of the mean integrated squared error as a
function of the bandwidth. Obtained using a leave-one-out cross validation procedure.
































































































































































































average ceteris paribus eﬀect test for average ceteris paribus eﬀect test for
E[ϕ(0,U,V)] additive bias het. E[ϕ(1,U,V)] additive bias het.
math ability at 7 -0.020 0.114*** 0.135 -0.500* 0.343 0.095** -0.248 -0.227
(0.104) (0.042) (0.084) (0.275) (0.390) (0.042) (0.386) (0.755)
math ability missing 0.030 0.035 0.005 0.024 -0.226 0.122*** 0.348 -0.949
(0.110) (0.029) (0.097) (0.323) (0.396) (0.029) (0.391) (0.685)
mother’s years of education 0.004 0.010 0.006 -0.034 -0.060 0.007 0.067* 0.013
(0.012) (0.022) (0.006) (0.038) (0.037) (0.022) (0.040) (0.071)
mother’s years of education missing 0.049 0.063** 0.014 -0.183 -0.551 0.107*** 0.658 0.607
(0.136) (0.025) (0.078) (0.407) (0.427) (0.025) (0.453) (0.817)
father intermediate -0.071 -0.061* 0.010 -0.467 -0.044 -0.003 0.042 -0.014
(0.079) (0.032) (0.043) (0.354) (0.239) (0.032) (0.223) (0.387)
indicator for London 0.201*** 0.211*** 0.011 -0.024 -0.109 0.063 0.171 -0.287
(0.057) (0.045) (0.047) (0.182) (0.210) (0.045) (0.205) (0.310)
indicator for Wales -0.061 -0.074 -0.013 0.038 -0.036 -0.038 -0.002 0.013
(0.074) (0.052) (0.060) (0.213) (0.260) (0.052) (0.257) (0.440)
indicator for Scotland -0.193*** -0.078 0.114** -0.418*** 0.270 0.006 -0.265 0.076
(0.051) (0.068) (0.045) (0.158) (0.213) (0.068) (0.210) (0.373)
constant 2.054*** 1.595*** -0.459*** 1.193*** 2.898*** 2.034*** -0.864* 0.036
(0.150) (0.130) (0.108) (0.407) (0.470) (0.130) (0.512) (0.989)
Standard errors in parenthesis were calculated from 1,000 bootstrap replications and take the ﬁrst stage estimation error into account. 1 through 3 stars
indicates signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

























Plotted for man aged 33 who has a math ability test score of 0.5, whose mother has 9 years of education,
whose father is not an intermediate employee, and who does not live in London, Scotland or Wales.
Figure 7: Conditional average structural function for individual with median characteristics.College Education and Wages in the U.K. 33
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